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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_____________ 
 
No. 18-2054 
_____________ 
 
BASHEER HARRISON, 
                    Appellant  
 
 v. 
 
 THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE STATE OF PENNSYLVANIA;  
 SUPERINTENDENT GRATERFORD SCI; THE DISTRICT ATTORNEY 
 OF THE COUNTY OF PHILADELPHIA  
_______________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania  
 (D.C. No. 2-14-cv-02114) 
District Judge:  Hon. Nitza I. Quiñones Alejandro 
_______________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
November 12, 2019 
 
Before:   JORDAN, SCIRICA, and RENDELL, Circuit Judges. 
 
(Filed: November 25, 2019) 
 _______________ 
 
OPINION∗ 
_______________ 
 
  
                                                 
∗ This disposition is not an opinion of the full court and, pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7, 
does not constitute binding precedent. 
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JORDAN, Circuit Judge. 
 Basheer Harrison1 appeals the order of the District Court denying his petition for 
habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241 and 2254.  He claims that the reasonable doubt 
instruction given to the jury at trial deprived him of due process.  Seeing no error in that 
instruction, we will affirm. 
I. BACKGROUND 
On December 19, 2004, Harrison and Anthony Funny, while on Funny’s front 
porch, had a physical fight over a gun.  In the course of the struggle, Harrison shot 
Funny, who later died from his injuries.  After the shooting, Harrison dropped the gun 
and ran across the street to his car.  Having witnessed the struggle from the doorway, 
Funny’s stepson, Louis Seabrook, came onto the porch and watched as Harrison, whom 
he knew, got into the car.  As Seabrook was tending to his stepfather on the porch, two 
other armed men opened fire on Seabrook and Funny.  Those two shooters then got in 
Harrison’s car with him and the three drove away.   
Seabrook promptly called the police.  When the officers arrived on the scene, he 
described the vehicle and license plate number.  The officers radioed a description of the 
vehicle and plate number to other police and received back a report of the vehicle’s 
location.  The officers took Seabrook to that location, where he identified Harrison as the 
man who shot Funny.  Seabrook later also identified the two other shooters from a photo 
                                                 
1 In state court proceedings, Harrison was referred to as Basheer Hairston, which 
the Commonwealth claims is how he referred to himself.  Harrison now claims that his 
actual surname is Harrison.  This case is captioned accordingly, and we refer to him by 
that name.   
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array.  Physical evidence from the scene, including a gun and cartridge casings, 
corroborated Seabrook’s testimony.   
Harrison was arrested and charged with murder, attempted murder, aggravated 
assault, and possession of an instrument of crime.  At trial, a jury found him guilty of 
third-degree murder, attempted murder, aggravated assault, and possession of an 
instrument of a crime. 2   
Before deliberations began, the judge instructed the jury on reasonable doubt, as 
follows: 
Let me speak to you about reasonable doubt.  Although the Commonwealth 
has the burden of proving that a defendant is guilty, this does not mean that 
the Commonwealth must prove its case beyond all doubt or to a 
mathematical certainty.  Nor must it demonstrate the complete impossibility 
of innocence.  A reasonable doubt is a doubt that would cause a 
reasonably careful and sensible person to pause, to hesitate, to refrain 
from acting upon a matter of highest importance in his or her own affairs 
or to his or her own interests.  A reasonable doubt must fairly arise out of 
the evidence that was presented or out of the lack of evidence presented 
with respect to some element of a crime charged.   
 
A reasonable doubt must be a real doubt.  It may not be an imagined one 
nor may it be a doubt that’s manufactured to avoid carrying out an 
unpleasant duty.  So, to summarize, you may not find the defendant guilty 
based upon a mere suspicion of guilt.  The Commonwealth has the burden 
of proving the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.  If the 
Commonwealth has met that burden, then the defendant is no longer 
presumed to be innocent and you should find him guilty.  On the other 
hand, if the Commonwealth has not met its burden, then you must find him 
not guilty.  
 
(App. at 102-03) (emphasis added). 
                                                 
2 Harrison was initially charged with first-degree murder.  At trial, however, he 
was granted an acquittal on the first-degree murder charge, as well as conspiracy charges, 
after the presentation of the Commonwealth’s case.   
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After the guilty verdict, Harrison was sentenced to consecutive terms of twenty to 
forty years of imprisonment for murder, seven and one-half to fifteen years of 
imprisonment for attempted murder, and one and one-half to five years of imprisonment 
for possession of an instrument of a crime.   
Represented by his trial counsel, Harrison filed direct appeals, and his conviction 
was affirmed.  With new counsel, Harrison also completed Pennsylvania’s collateral 
review process.  On collateral review, his petition was dismissed without a hearing, and 
the dismissal was affirmed by both the Superior Court and the Supreme Court of 
Pennsylvania.  Not at anytime during trial, direct appeal, or on collateral review did 
Harrison raise a due process claim based on the reasonable doubt instruction, as he now 
does. 3   
After losing on collateral review, Harrison filed the present petition for a writ of 
habeas corpus, which was referred to a Magistrate Judge for a report and 
recommendation.  The Magistrate Judge recommended that the petition be denied.  The 
District Court agreed and denied relief, but it certified the due process issue for appeal to 
us, and this appeal followed. 
                                                 
3 Harrison frankly admits that, for habeas purposes, his failure to raise his due 
process claim earlier amounts to a procedural default.  Harrison claims, however, that 
ineffective assistance of counsel excuses the procedural default that would otherwise 
prohibit his federal habeas claim.  See Martinez v. Ryan, 566 U.S. 1, 14 (2012).  We 
recently considered the procedural default analysis at length in Workman v. 
Superintendent Albion SCI, 915 F.3d 928 (3d Cir. 2019), although we note that the 
District Court reviewed Harrison’s petition prior to the Workman decision.  Because 
Harrison’s due process argument fails on the merits, we do not address his procedural 
default.   
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II. DISCUSSION4 
 Harrison asserts that he was denied due process by the trial court’s instruction to 
the jury on reasonable doubt.  Specifically, he claims that the phrase “to pause, to 
hesitate, to refrain from acting” impermissibly lowered the prosecution’s burden of proof.  
We disagree. 
A. Reasonable Doubt Jury Instruction 
The Due Process Clause ensures that when an individual is accused of a crime, the 
jury must convict that person “upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact 
necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged.”  In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 
364 (1970).  Accordingly, any instructions a judge gives to a jury on what it means to 
find someone guilty beyond a reasonable doubt must “correctly convey the concept of 
reasonable doubt to the jury.”  Victor v. Nebraska, 511 U.S. 1, 5 (1994) (alterations and 
citation omitted).  Jury instructions violate due process when “there is a reasonable 
likelihood that the jury understood the instructions to allow conviction based on proof 
insufficient to meet the [reasonable doubt] standard.”  Id. at 6.    
Harrison claims that the reasonable doubt instruction at his trial violated his due 
process rights because it included the phrase “to refrain from acting” as being conjunctive 
with the phrases “to pause” and “to hesitate” in describing reasonable doubt.  While “to 
pause” and “to hesitate,” reflect an appropriate description of reasonable doubt, Harrison 
                                                 
4 The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241 and 2254.  We have 
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291 and 2253.  We review the District Court’s 
legal conclusions de novo.  See Thomas v. Horn, 570 F.3d 105, 113 (3d Cir. 2009). 
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argues, “to refrain from acting” impermissibly lowers the prosecution’s burden of proof.  
Harrison cites our opinion in Thomas v. Horn, in which we said in dicta that the phrase to 
“‘restrain from acting’… decreases, to some extent, the burden of proof[.]”5  570 F.3d 
105, 118 (3d Cir. 2009).      
We disagree with Harrison’s reading of the jury instruction.  First, we are not 
convinced that the most natural reading of the instruction is as a conjunctive list.  The 
lack of an actual conjunction in the list more naturally indicates that the words “to pause, 
to hesitate, to refrain from acting” were intended as a disjunctive, illustrative list of 
behaviors that could reflect what it means to have a reasonable doubt.  This is 
underscored by the fact that “to pause” and “to hesitate” are nearly synonymous, thus 
negating the need for a conjunctive “and” to include both behaviors.  Importantly, and as 
Harrison notes, this Court and the Pennsylvania courts have repeatedly approved jury 
instructions that include “to refrain from acting” or “to restrain from acting” when it is in 
a disjunctive list.  See, e.g., id. at 119; Commonwealth v. Uderra, 862 A.2d 74, 92 (Pa. 
2004).   
Second, even if the jury instruction were properly understood as setting forth a 
conjunctive list, we approved the “to restrain from acting” formulation of reasonable 
doubt in Thomas.  Although we indicated that “to restrain from acting” is not an exact 
synonym of “to pause” or “to hesitate,” we upheld the jury instruction that included that 
phrase.  We reasoned that “even though we believe that the ‘restrain from acting’ 
                                                 
5 The parties agree, as do we, that “to refrain from acting” and “to restrain from 
acting” are effectively synonymous.   
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formulation lessens the prosecution’s burden of proof, we cannot say that its use is 
unconstitutional.”  Thomas, 570 F.3d at 118.   
Whether understood as conjunctive or disjunctive, the wording at issue in this 
instruction falls within the range of permissible instructions on reasonable doubt.  There 
was no warrant for habeas relief here, and the District Court correctly denied the petition. 
III. CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the order of the District Court. 
